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"If you raise the minimum wage a little - not a huge amount, but a little - you won’t 
necessarily cause a big employment reduction. In some cases you could get an employment 
increase." David Card, UC Berkeley, Interview with the Institute for Research on Labour and 
Employment, December 2006. 
 
"Just as no physicist would claim that "water runs uphill”, no self-respecting economist 
would claim that increases in the minimum wage increase employment." - James M. 
Buchanan, 1986, Nobel Laureate in Economics, Wall Street Journal, April 1996. 
 
The introduction of national minimum wages in South Africa is a relatively recent 
phenomenon by international standards. Historically New Zealand was the first country to 
introduce minimum wage legislation. This was done in 1894, followed shortly afterwards by 
Australia and later the United Kingdom and the United States (Starr, 1981). While employee 
relationships in South Africa were partially governed by the Master and Servants Act (1896) 
and the Industrial Conciliation Act (1924) - later to become the Labour Relations Act (1956) 
- it was not until 1999 that the first official national minimum wage legislation was passed
2
. 
Since 1999 South Africa gradually developed a detailed minimum wage schedule covering 
eleven sectors of the economy. Labour market institutions were also created to enforce the 
new laws; the efficacy of which has hitherto remained unexamined. The legislated minimum 
wage in South Africa varies across, and within sectors. Mandated wages within a sector can 
differ depending upon occupation type, the number of hours worked, as well as geographic 




Internationally, minimum wages are widely used as a policy tool to protect vulnerable 
workers from exploitation and help alleviate poverty. In South Africa the socioeconomic 
arguments supporting minimum wages are well established, that is, minimum wages aim to 
redistribute earnings to low paid workers, assist workers with weak bargaining power, and lift 
the working poor out of poverty. The economic effect that minimum wages have, on 
employment in particular, is a classic labour economics question which has attracted 
considerable attention in the international literature. However, as the two introductory quotes 
illustrate, there is some disagreement among economists as to the precise impact of minimum 
wages. More broadly there are those who question whether minimum wages are a welfare-
enhancing intervention at all. The recent introduction of minimum wage laws in South Africa 
makes comprehensive enquiry into such issues particularly pertinent for economists and 
policymakers. It is therefore surprising that few empirical studies have investigated the 
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 This was for the Contract Cleaning sector. 
3
 The minimum wage regulations for each sector are contained within a Sectoral Determination; this is a legal 
document which refines conditions outlined in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA, 1997). In 
addition to prescribing minimum wages this document outlines legal requirements for written employment 














impact of these policies on the local labour market. In an effort to begin filling the gap this 
paper focuses on the agricultural sector in South Africa. 
 
The first component of this paper investigates and measures the aggregate impact of the 
Agricultural Sectoral Determination. Observing changes in farmworker earnings, contract 
coverage, employment, and the number hours worked per week, provides insight into the 
impact of the law. These changes are examined using data from the South African Labour 
Force Surveys (LFS) 2000-2007 which includes three years before the law was introduced 
and four years afterwards. Descriptive statistics and difference-in-differences regressions are 
used to analyse the impact of the law. A control group, made up of similar workers not 
subject to the law, is used for comparison. Results show that the Sectoral Determination 
caused significant growth in average farmworker earnings and an increase in the number of 
workers holding written employment contracts. However, the probability of agricultural 
employment for a typical worker appears to have fallen, while hours worked were unaffected. 
 
After analysing these changes, the second component of the paper examines the associated 
and underexplored issue of enforcement and compliance. The number of farmworkers 
receiving sub-minimum wages (i.e. noncompliance) in South Africa is high and thus the 
observed impact of the law can be seen as a lower bound. I test to see whether the increase in 
wages which occurs over the period can be linked to formal enforcement of the Sectoral 
Determination. The number of labour inspectors per capita in each province is utilised as a 
measure of the level of enforcement. In addition I use the presence of a local Labour Centre 
as a broad but more disaggregated measure of enforcement. The evidence suggests that 
existing government enforcement has had no observable effect on compliance in the post-law 
period. To explain this result a theoretical model of employer compliance is presented. The 
model uses inspection data from the Western Cape .the province with the lowest levels of 
violation in the country. It is shown that the economic benefits of noncompliance for an 
average employer far outweigh the expected costs, thus the typical profit-maximising 
employer should opt for noncompliance. I then use an ‘index of violation derived in Bhorat, 
Kanbur and Mayet (2012) to analyse changes in compliance that have occurred in the post-
law period. This index allows one to analyse the depth of minimum wage violation over time 
and in this manner test for partial compliance with the law. Results suggest that many 
employers have increased wages after the law, but not all the way up to the minimum. 
 
The paper is laid out as follows. Section 1 continues to briefly review key papers in the 
minimum wage literature and then examines the emerging research on enforcement and 
compliance. Section 2 begins by describing the data and addressing possible data issues. In 
Section 3 the empirical approach and method are outlined and explained. Section 4 presents 
evidence on the effects of the law. Here I explore the impacts of the minimum wage on: 
employment, farmworker earnings, contract coverage, and hours worked, using descriptive 
statistics as well as statistical tests which isolate the direct impact of the law. Section 5 
describes the enforcement process in South Africa in brief and then examines the effect of 
formal enforcement activities on compliance using statistical tests. I show that employer 













examining changes in the depth of violation over the period. Finally, Section 6 concludes and 
comments on the findings. 
1.1 International Minimum Wage Literature 
Theoretical work on the effects of minimum wages in the labour market began in America 
around the early 1940s with economists such as George Stigler (1946) and Andrew Lester 
(1947). Both authors postulated models explaining how employment would respond to 
minimum wage increases depending on the structure of the labour market. Consequently, 
others in the profession began accumulating empirical evidence to examine the issue in more 
detail. This debate became critically relevant to American policymakers given that by 1975 
over ninety percent of the workforce was covered by federal minimum wage laws (Brown, 
1999). Consensus came to hold that minimum wage increases of ten percent would reduce 
employment by between one and three percent on average (Brown, Gilroy, Kohen, 1982). For 
various reasons, by the early 1990s the minimum wage question reappeared in public policy 
debates and researchers began to re-examine the accumulating evidence
4
. In particular, one 
strand of work moved away from the standard time-series analysis which had formed the core 
of previous empirical studies. Instead researchers used state-level variations in wages and 
economic conditions to examine the impact of the minimum wage. Essentially this provided a 
natural experiment where the effect of the minimum wage on a particular group of workers 
could be isolated by comparing their outcomes with a similar group not subject to the law. 
Research in this vein became classified as the new minimum wage literature and it is upon 
such work that this paper builds. 
 
The new minimum wage research began in the 1990s with Card (1992), Card and Krueger 
(1994, 1995), Neumark and Wascher (1992), and has provided valuable insights into labour 
market dynamics. The research has also generated extensive discussion around the specific 
effects of minimum wage policies. Debate was initially sparked by the provocative findings 
of David Card and Alan Krueger’s (1994) seminal paper on the subject. Card and Krueger’s 
work on the fast food industry in New Jersey produced evidence showing that minimum 
wage increases may not always lead to employment decreases and in some cases may even 
increase employment. A portion of subsequent research supports Card and Krueger’s 
findings
5
. While such findings are compelling and have forced economists to reconsider long-
held beliefs on the subject they have not overturned the consensus that in almost all cases 
higher wages will reduce employment. The weight of accumulated evidence from subsequent 
work appears to favour a nuanced version of this traditional economic rationale. Neumark 
and Wascher (2007) offer the most comprehensive review of the new minimum wage 
literature to date and draw several important conclusions
6
. They conclude from their review 
                                                          
4
 See Neumark and Wascher (2007) for a detailed explanation. 
5
 See Machin and Manning (1994), Bhaskar and To (1999), Houba and van Lomwell (2001), Petrakis and 
Vlassis (2004). The explanatino for why minimum wages can increase employment relates to the specific 
market structure, see Card and Krueger (1994) for a full explanation.  
6
 For particular studies see: Card (1992), Card and Krueger (1994, 1995, 2000); Neumark and Wascher (1992); 
Katz and Krueger (1992); Spriggs and Klein (1994); Deere, Murphy and Welch (1995); Baker, Benjamin and  
Stanger (1999); Neumark and Wascher (2000); Burkhauser, Couch and Wittenburg (2000a, 2000b); Bernstein 













that there are very few if any studies that provide convincing evidence of positive 
employment effects of minimum wages (Neumark and Wascher, 2007:121). In fact evidence 
shows that negative employment effects are consistently apparent when a study does not 
restrict its focus to a narrow sub-group or single industry. The authors add that “studies 
[which] focus on the least-skilled groups provide relatively overwhelming evidence of 
stronger disemployment effects for these groups” (Neumark and Wascher, 2007:121). 
 
Importantly, the Neumark and Wascher (2007) review does not discount work which presents 
evidence of negligible or even positive employment impacts in certain cases. Rather, they 
emphasise that the precise effects of increases in the minimum wage have become an 
empirical question. The extent of any effects depend significantly on the economic context, 
and, especially in developing countries, the extent to which employers actually comply with 
the law should not be overlooked (as I illustrate below). Finally, in the event of introducing 
new minimum wage legislation, the level at which the minimum is set relative to existing 
wages can make a significant difference
7
. The points raised here should help inform 
expectations in the case of South Africa. 
1.2 South African Minimum Wage Literature 
Reliable economic research studying the effects of minimum wages in South Africa is limited 
and published work that compares with the international literature is even more so
8
. The most 
comprehensive research that is available has focused on the effects of the Sectoral 
Determination on domestic workers. Unpublished papers by Hertz (2005, 2006) and more 
recently Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2010) examine the impact of the legislation on a number 
of observables in this sector. The authors use contrasting methodologies but their overall 
conclusions are comparable
9
. Immediate and significant increases in earnings are reported 
after the introduction of the law in both studies; this increase is evident despite the fact that 
compliance is low. The requirement for employers to establish a written contract with 
employees formed part of the new legislation and again both studies found that the number of 
domestic workers with such contracts increased significantly in the post-law period. 
Regarding employment, Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2010) present a model showing that the 
probability of employment for a typical domestic worker is unchanged after the law, while 
Hertz (2005) suggests that changes in employment experienced by domestic workers was no 
different to workers in other occupations. The results suggest that employment was not 
adversely affected by the law, even though wages rose. I employ methods of testing which 
incorporate the approaches used by both authors to examine the case of agricultural workers. 
In particular, the methodological approach of Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2010) informs a 
large portion of this paper. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(2001); Strobl and Walsh (2003); Alatas and Cameron (2003); Chapman (2004); Gindling and Terrell (2004); 
Bazen and Le Gallo (2006), Allegretto, Dube and Reich (2008, 2010, 2011). 
7
 Work by Nicole Fortin and Thomas Lemieux (2000) provides a clear example of this. 
8
 One reason for this may be the complex minimum wage schedule in South Africa which makes econometric 
analysis using the available household survey data very difficult. 
9
 The most important methodological contrasts between the two papers are that Hertz (2005) employs a 
difference-in-differences approach similar to Card and Krueger (1995) and uses Magisterial Districts as the unit 
of analysis, while Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2010) use a difference-in-differences approach found in Lee 














A report by the Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU, 2008) prepared for the South 
African Department of Labour (DoL) examines the effect of the Sectoral Determinations on a 
range of labour market variables. Specifically, the effects on earnings, poverty and 
employment are estimated for each sector and for the economy as a whole. This analysis 
involves examining sector-specific data over time, as well as calculating the economy-wide 
effects using a general equilibrium model. While the report does not statistically isolate the 
influence of each Sectoral Determination over time it does provide some useful results. On 
average the data shows that real wages have risen between 2001 and 2007 in all sectors. 
Through the calculation of employment-output elasticities the study finds a small, positive 
relationship between wages and employment for nearly all sectors. Notably, this positive 
relationship is absent in the Agricultural sector which appears to have experienced ‘jobless 
growth’. The minimum wage may have had some impact here. Employment in Agriculture is 
reported to have declined by 4.9% over the period. Lastly, the overall poverty-reducing 
effects of the law are found to be limited. The report opines that this may be due to low levels 
of compliance in all sectors and the fact that many low-income households rely on non-wage 
income such as social grants. It is also argued that aggregate income gains resulting from the 
minimum wage are offset by inflation, or possible employment losses in the case of 
agriculture. 
 
Two final South African studies analyse the impact of minimum wages in the agricultural 
industry. Both authors focus on a subset of workers using independently collected survey 
data. Conradie (2004) presents a detailed study of wine and table-grape farmers in the 
Western Cape, while Murray and Van Walbeek (2007) conduct a case study of farm workers 
in the Kwazulu Natal sugar industry. Conradie (2004), using data from a survey of 190 grape 
farmers, calculates an elasticity of demand for labour which is relatively inelastic. She shows 
that a wage increase of ten percent will decrease employment by between three and six 
percent, depending on the industry. Disemployment effects are revealed to be lower on wine 
farms because labour is a smaller cost item. The conclusion follows that higher wages do 
appear to reduce employment, but only slightly. Contrastingly, Murray and Van Walbeeck 
(2007) use data from a survey of 103 sugarcane farmers and report no large disemployment 
as a result of the law. The authors do suggest that decreases in the average number of hours 
worked have occurred due to the minimum wage, and that there was a move from labour to 
capital-intensive farming methods where possible. The reported move toward capitalisation 
makes the fact that there are no large disemployment effects quite surprising. Unfortunately 
the study relies only on qualitative data gleaned from interviews with farmers and lacks 
empirical rigour. Both papers suggest that the specific effects of the law may differ by 
industry and region. 
 
The existing body of work (although sparse) does provide insights which help to inform the 
approach and method in this paper. It is clear from past work what effect the Agricultural 
Sectoral Determination should have on earnings and contracts in the sector. Less clear are 













person. Even less apparent is what result should be expected from the equally interesting 
enquiry into the effect of formal enforcement on compliance. The issue of enforcement and 
compliance is one which holds particular relevance for the developing world where 
noncompliance is high. 
1.3 International Enforcement Literature 
In general, regulatory institutions are more developed in industrialized countries where 
noncompliance tends to be lower and less of a central concern (Basu, Chau and Kanbur, 
2007). Contrastingly, noncompliance is a serious problem in developing nations and therefore 
requires more attention. If minimum wage legislation was comprehensively enforced in 
developing countries the overall effects of minimum wages on employment and other 
outcomes would be substantially greater
10
. The mechanics of minimum wage enforcement 
and compliance in such contexts is an area of the labour market which is under-researched 
but one which is essential to a comprehensive understanding of labour market dynamics, and 
carries significant policy relevance.  
 
In contrast to the rich international work on the impact of minimum wage laws there is an 
insubstantial literature on the enforcement of these regulations. Indeed many studies on the 
impacts of the minimum wage implicitly assume that full compliance exists. There is, 
however, a small economic literature on the subject of compliance which began with 
Ashenfelter and Smith (1979). The standard economic models of enforcement predict low 
levels of compliance whenever the costs of complying with the law exceed the expected costs 
of violation, for a typical firm (See Ashenfelter & Smith, 1979)
11
. In a setting with 
comparatively weak formal enforcement mechanisms and insubstantial penalties .a 
description which I show defines South Africa’s situation .one would expect low levels of 
compliance. While the theoretical research has become fairly advanced, empirical work on 
enforcement and compliance remains underdeveloped
12
. This subject is revisited in Section 5.  
 
Evidence from a handful of developing country studies shows that compliance is indeed low. 
These few studies also reveal that the problem of compliance with minimum wage laws 
remains largely unexplored. Jones (1998) finds that minimum wage laws in Ghana reduce 
formal-sector employment but increase informal-sector employment. The assumption is that 
compliance in the informal sector is low and thus it can absorb the unemployed but pays 
wages below the regulated minimum. In general it is difficult to quantify the impact of formal 
                                                          
10
 For example, Strobl & Walsh (2003) propose a model which shows that the potential costs of minimum wage 
laws in Trinidad and Tobago would rise significantly in a scenario of full compliance. 
11
 The typical model is a simple calculation which sets the expected gains from violation 
against the gains from compliance: 
,  
Where Π is firm profit, M is minimum wage, r is rental rate, p is price, λ is probability of inspection, w is 
optimal wage, and D is the penalty for violation. In this equation if the profit from violating minus the penalty 
exceeds zero the firm will violate.  For more work on enforcement see Grenier (1982), Chang & Erlich (1985), 
Weil (2005), and Basu, Chan & Kanbur (2009). 
12













enforcement. This is largely due to the lack of data in most developing countries, and the fact 
that enforcement itself is difficult to measure. Ronconi (2008) uses the number of labour 
inspectors as a proxy for formal enforcement in Argentina. The study finds a positive 
relationship between the number of inspectors per capita and the extent and size of penalties 
imposed. It was also evident that provinces with a higher number of labour inspectors per 
capita were more likely to comply with labour regulations. This will be tested in the case of 
South Africa.  
 
Another study investigating enforcement in Latin America was undertaken by Almeida and 
Carneiro (2008). The authors investigate enforcement of labour market regulations in Brazil. 
They find that an increase in the number of inspections was associated with an increase in the 
share of registered workers. In addition, more inspections are related to better social security 
coverage for workers and a greater probability of earning the minimum wage. The study also 
found that a higher level of enforcement exists in the richer and more developed cities of the 
country. Lastly, Andalón & Pagés (2008) investigate the enforcement of minimum wages in 
Kenya and provide comparable evidence. Minimum wages were better enforced and had 
stronger effects in urban areas than in the agriculture industry. Additionally the authors 
estimate that a ten percent increase in the minimum to median wage ratio is associated with a 
decline in the share of formal employment of up to six percent. However, this is found to be 
offset by an increase in self-employment of similar magnitude. Such compensatory increases 
are less likely to occur in an agricultural sector such as South Africa’s where the informal 
sector is extremely small by international standards (Devey, Skinner, and Valodia; 2006). 
1.4 South African Enforcement Literature 
South African research focused on the enforcement of minimum wage laws is almost non-
existent. Very little has been done to firstly, measure the levels of compliance with the new 
Sectoral Determinations; and secondly, understand the nature and extent of the enforcement 
of labour regulation and the role of the authorities. It is unclear what impact formal 
enforcement mechanisms have on employer compliance, if any. In a pioneering study Bhorat, 
et al. (2012) show that compliance with minimum wage laws in South Africa is low .with 
over 45% of all covered workers receiving sub-minimum wages in 2007. The authors 
investigate the determinants of this compliance. Their findings show that labour inspectors, 
firm size, the local unemployment level, and certain personal characteristics, all influence 
whether an individual receives sub-minimum wages. In this paper I show that despite 
observing similarly high levels of noncompliance in the agricultural sector, wages are rising 
in the wake of the law. The interesting question is therefore whether this ‘partial’ compliance 
by employers is linked to formal enforcement or not.  
 
A technical report written by the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2010) identifies a 
number of possible reasons why enforcement has been unsuccessful in achieving higher 
levels of compliance. Based on a nine-day visit to the South African DoL they highlight a 
few key problems which include: a lack of qualified staff, poor remuneration, and an absence 
of collaboration with other interest groups. The report also identifies a general lack of 













labour inspection. These are cited as possible reasons for the high levels of violation found by 
Bhorat et al. (2012). While this report is informative in exploring the functioning of the 
Labour Inspectorate it does not present any empirical evidence on enforcement or examine 
the impact that enforcement has on compliance. This is a question I aim to address.  
 
Analysing the impact of the Agricultural Sectoral Determination and exploring the effect that 
the enforcement of these regulations has had, is important. This work sheds light on what 
happens when minimum wages are introduced into a low-wage, unskilled sector and explores 
formal enforcement in a developing country context, providing some initial evidence on the 
effects in the case of agriculture in South Africa. A discussion of the data used in this analysis 
is the focus of the following section. 
2 Data Issues 
2.1 The Labour Force Survey (LFS)  
The primary data for this study are drawn from 15 waves of the Labour Force Survey (LFS), 
starting in September 2000 and ending in September 2007. These are bi-annual, rotating 
panel, surveys conducted in February/March and September each year and all data are self-
reported. The chosen sample includes six waves before the l gislation’s effective date (March 
2003) and nine afterwards. Given the relatively high frequency of the surveys it is possible to 
analyse the immediate effects of the law. All 15 waves are pooled and treated as repeated 
cross sections over time
13
. The LFS covers approximately 30,000 households in each wave 
and this includes between 2,000 and 2,800 farmworkers per wave over the period. In order to 
evaluate which minimum wage applied to each individual it was necessary to assign 
individuals to geographic areas. This was done by matching geographical information 
available in the LFS to areas A and B listed in the Sectoral Determination (See Appendix 
Table A1).  
2.2 Sample Selection and Key Variables 
Section 1 and Section 34 of the Sectoral Determination for Farmworkers (2002) specifically 
define the individuals to whom the legislation applies. Based on this I identify the relevant 
sample of farmworkers in each wave of the LFS by the overlap of two distinct classifications: 
the four-digit SASCO
14
 occupation codes as well as the three-digit ISIC
15
 industry codes. 
Those individuals who are classified as agricultural workers in the LFS but to whom the law 
does not apply are excluded – these include subsistence farmers, independent contractors and 
managers or professionals. The sample thus disregards individuals to whom the Sectoral 
Determination does not apply. It must be noted that existing data on workers in the 
agricultural sector available from Statistics South Africa and the Department of Agriculture 
                                                          
13
 Pooled data offers the advantages of large sample sizes, the ability to create variables that elude study in the 
simple cross-sectional case, and the ability to capture cross-sectional and over-time variation simultaneously 
(Podestà, 2002). I choose not to create a panel using the LFSs as this would result in too small a sample size 
over the period in question, see Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2010) for a complete explanation.  
14
 South African Standard Classification of Occupations (SASCO). 
15













base their classification of farmworkers only on the ISIC industry codes. This does result in 
some significant aggregate differences which prevent direct comparison of variables such as 
employment, for example.  
 
In order to assess whether the changes experienced by farmworkers are unique I identify a 
control group that has similar characteristics to farmworkers. The statistical analysis is used 
to check if the observed changes are shared by this comparable group of workers who are not 
subject to the law. The control group is made up of unskilled, non-unionised individuals of 
working age, who are not covered by another Sectoral Determination which might interfere 
with the results. Here again, both the occupation and industry codes are used to identify this 
group. For clarity, this group includes occupations such as: street vendors, packers, municipal 
garbage collectors, construction workers, manufacturing and transport labourers, and 
elementary machine operators. The agricultural minimum wage law does not apply to them 
and is set at a level far below their median wage. Changes in the control group’s wages, 
employment, contract coverage and hours worked give an indication of movements in the 
economy when the agricultural minimum wage was introduced.  
 
Monthly wages reported in brackets in the LFS are transformed into point estimates by 
random allocation to a uniform distribution within the bracket to maintain variation
16
. This 
accounts for between five and ten percent of the sample in each wave on average. All 
monthly wages are then combined and converted into hourly wages. The conversion uses 
responses to the question “How many hours do you usually work in a week?” to obtain the 
number of hours worked per week for each individual. Wages are deflated by the annual 
Consumer Price Index (CPIX) when analysing changes over time. Individuals who report no 
earnings at all are excluded from the sample, as are those who report working more than 
fifteen hours a day, and those with monthly income high enough to exempt them from the 
legislation. Maximum earnings for farmworkers covered by the legislation are defined in the 
Sectoral Determination and are equivalent to the eligibility regulations for UIF contributions 
and threshold earnings in the BCEA
17
. The sample includes all individuals of working age 




Finally, regarding enforcement and compliance, the data on Labour Inspectors were obtained 
directly from the South African DoL. The data details the number of inspectors employed in 
each province from 2002-2007 which is used as a proxy for formal enforcement of the 
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 A new seed is set in STATA for each bracket calculation. 
17
 Maximum monthly earnings: 
Binding from date Monthly maximum earnings 
January 2000 R7 774 
January 2001 R8 099 
April 2003 R8 836 
October 2005 R10 966 
July 2006 R11 662 
October 2007 R12 478 
 
18
 I use full-time workers as defined by the DoL, and exclude those working less than 27 hours per week as a 













legislation. The other proxy for enforcement is the number of Labour Centres in each 
Magisterial District which can be obtained from the DoL’s website
19
. These Labour Centres 
where then matched to the broader geographical unit of the District Council (See Table A1 in 
the Appendix). Data on inspections and penalties were obtained from the Western Cape 
Inspection and Enforcement Services (IES), containing information on the number of 
inspections conducted in the agricultural sector in 2007 as well as the levels of compliance. 
Additionally, interviews and focus groups with labour inspectors and IES officials in the 
Western Cape were conducted. These provided important insights into the enforcement 
process.  
2.3 Sample Weights 
A further aspect of the data worth highlighting is the choice of sample weights for this 
analysis. A concern raised by Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2010) as well as Hertz (2005) is that 
the sample weights for the LFS 2001 and LFS 2002 are linked to the 1996 South African 
Census, while the weights for the post-2002 surveys are benchmarked to the 2001 Census. 
This generates inconsistencies (See Hertz, 2006). If one intends to analyse cross-sectional 
data over time it is important that the data produce accurate trends. As Branson (2009) points 
out, there are two main concerns with the LFS weights: “First, the auxiliary data used as a 
benchmark in the post-stratification adjustment is unreliable and inconsistent over time and 
hence results in temporal inconsistencies even at the aggregate level. Second, since the 
adjustment is made at the person level until 2003, there is no hierarchical consistency 
between the person and household weighted series. This means that analyses done at the 
household and person level will not necessarily agree” (Branson 2009:5). Branson (2009) has 
created a new set of individual weights using entropy estimation which are shown to be more 
reliable. For these reasons I do not use the standard LFS individual-level weights but rather 
those provided by Branson (2009)
20
. I continue to use the post-stratification unit (PSU) and 
district level weights from the LFS which adjust for the survey design.  
2.4 Data Limitations 
Some data limitations facing this study must be mentioned. Firstly, Fallon and Lucas (1998) 
give reason to believe that the elasticity of labour demand in South Africa can vary 
considerably within a sector. Thus average figures for the entire agricultural sector may not 
pick up significant intra-sector variation. Unfortunately, given the constraints of the LFS data 
higher levels of disaggregation are not possible; however, a sectoral study of this nature can 
nonetheless prove valuable by providing a sense of aggregate impacts. Secondly, as noted by 
Hertz (2005) and Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2010) it is impossible to capture any non-
monetary income received by farmworkers such as housing, food, transport, utilities or any 
other in-kind transfers from employers. Importantly the legislation does restrict such non-
monetary payments to ten percent of a worker’s salary in the case of agriculture and this is 
taken into account where necessary. Nevertheless it is possible that increases in wages after 
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 The website is: www.labour.gov (Many thanks to Taryn Dinkelman for sharing information on coded Labour 
Centre data). 
20














the introduction of the law may have been a reallocation of non-pecuniary benefits offered in 
the pre-law period. This is the biggest challenge for analysing wage gains in the sector.  
 
Thirdly, the variations in the reported earnings of agricultural workers are larger than 
expected which make it di¢ cult to predict national average wage figures with high levels of 
confidence. Logarithmic transformations are used in the econometric analysis to generate a 
normal distribution of wages. Moreover, in the statistical analysis earnings are clustered at 
the district level where the variance is lower. Fourthly, it may be that a common employer 
response to the law is the casualization of labour. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this may 
be the case in agriculture where labour brokers are increasingly prevalent and coordinate less 
direct formal employment and more subcontracting (DoL, 2011). There may be a correlation 
in South Africa between stricter wage legislation (higher minimum wages, restrictions on 
dismissal etc.) and the growth of the labour broking industry. However, the LFS data on 
seasonal and contract workers within agriculture does not appear to have changed 
significantly over the period and no data on labour brokers is available. Finally, the data on 
labour inspectors is only available at the provincial level and thus may fail to pick up the 
effect of enforcement accurately. The use of Labour Centre per District Council is an attempt 
to find a more localised measure of enforcement.  
3 Approach and Method 
3.1 The Effects of the Law 
Simple cross tabulations initially introduce the relevant data and provide a picture of general 
changes that have occurred over the period 2000-2007. Data for agricultural workers as well 
as the control group are presented. This is augmented by non-parametric kernel densities 
which are estimated for farmworker and control group wages to highlight the changing wage 
distributions over time. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests compare the distributions
21
. Finally, I test 
statistically for whether the observed changes are linked to the introduction of the law, and 
whether these changes are larger in areas where the gap between farmworker wages and the 
control group wages is greater.  
 
Two specifications are used. I first employ a standard difference-in-differences model 
analogous to Card and Krueger (1994): 
 
  (1) 
where,  is the outcome of interest (wages, contracts, hours worked) for individual i, in 
group   , in period t.  is the time dummy which captures ‘before-and-after’ effects.  
 is the dummy for whether an individual is in the treatment or control group 
(k=1, 2), which equals 1 if the individual is a farmworker and 0 if they are in the control 
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.  is the difference-in-differences term which confirms that 
outcomes are not the result of economy-wide shocks. This ensures that the observed changes 
are not shared by similar workers to whom the law does not apply.   
Secondly I specify a difference-in-differences model similar to Dinkelman and Ranchhod 
(2010) which tests to see whether wages increased more in areas where farmworker wages 
were lower in the pre-law period: 
,           (2) 
where,  is the outcome of interest for individual i, living in district j, in period t.  is 
the time dummy, and  controls for various worker characteristics such as Age, Education 
and Race. The wage gap ( ) is a constructed variable which identifies cross-sectional 
variation between District Councils in the pre-law period. I specify the wage gap as: 
)],    (3) 
where  is the median wage of the control group in district j and  is the median 
agricultural worker wage in district j. The wage gap is calculated using full-time wages in 
2002. This identifies the gap in wages between the two groups of workers for each district, in 
the pre-law period, and captures the intensity of the law. Areas with a larger gap would be 
expected to experience greater increases in wages in the post-law period if the law was 
binding. Comparison with the chosen control group accounts for any changes in wages that 
affected all workers over the period and controls for wage differences that are linked to 
geography.  
Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2010) construct a wage gap which is the difference between the 
legislated minimum wage and the median domestic worker wage, in the pre-law period. This 
is to see whether wages increased more in areas where the minimum wage had more ‘bite’. 
Importantly, their unit of analysis is the province. The fact that there are only nine provinces 
presents difficulties for reliable inference in this case. As a remedy the authors apply two 
separate corrective techniques which adjust the standard error - they use Eicker-White 
standard errors, and employ a two stage least squares regression technique. Hertz (2005) 
avoids the problem by using Magisterial Districts as the group level identi.er and thus has 361 
units of analysis instead of only nine. Unfortunately, as Dinkelman & Ranchhod (2010) point 
out, this leads to worryingly small within-cell sample sizes because certain Magisterial 
Districts contain less than ten observations. Taking both of these problems into account I 
propose a specification that uses District Councils as the unit of analysis instead of Provinces 
or Magisterial Districts
23
. There are 55 District Councils classified in the LFS which can be 
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used as units of analysis
24
. The estimates presented in this paper should therefore be more 
accurate than past work as they exploit greater cross-sectional variation but avoid small 
sample sizes which can bias the estimates. Moreover, this is a more disaggregated measure 
which may pick up changes that a provincial variable would overlook. 
 
In equation (1)  indicates the changes in the post-law period for both groups,  gives the 
average difference between farmworkers and the control group over the full period, and  
shows the change for farmworkers in the post-law period relative to the control group. In 
equation (2) the parameter  represents the average difference in outcomes for workers in 
low wage gap versus high wage gap areas across the entire period.  is the difference-in-
differences parameter and tells us how much more outcomes changed in the post-law period, 
in areas where the wage gap was largest. Lastly,  is also of interest as it tells us how the 
variable of interest changed on average after the law. As in all such natural experiments I 
must assume that in the absence of the law agricultural wages would be on the same general 
trend across districts as well as for both groups of workers. 
  
3.2 Enforcement and Compliance 
Given that large wage responses are observed for farmworkers it is important to explore 
whether formal enforcement affects employer compliance. To investigate the extent that 
external enforcement may have affected compliance two different models are used. Firstly, a 
difference-in-differences equation shows that employer responses do not vary significantly 
across areas with different inspection probabilities. Secondly a test for partial compliance, 
using an ‘index of violation’, shows that many farmworker’s wages have increased towards, 
but not up to, the legislated minimum.  
The difference-in-differences specification is identical to equation (2) but uses an 
enforcement variable in place of the wage gap. 
  (4) 
where  is the wage for individual i, in area j, at time t, and  include individual 
characteristics.  is the number of labour inspectors per capita in each province. 
This is intended to capture the effect of formal enforcement on the employer decision to pay 
higher wages. Given that data on inspectors is only available at the provincial level I use 
Eicker-White clustered standard errors at the group level
25
. I also make use of Labour Centre 
data and run the same set of regressions. Here  becomes the number of Labour 
Centre’s in each District Council. The hypothesis remains the same. It is expected that a 
greater inspector presence (captured by the number of inspectors or the presence of a Labour 
Centre) should result in a higher probability of inspection and thus more compliance by 
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employers. It is unlikely that this variable is endogenous as the allocation decision which 
controls the number of inspectors in each province is not based on previous compliance levels 
(DoL, 2011). Instead the responses from IES officials indicate that inspector allocation is 
based solely on the number of employers in each province.  
Building on theoretical work by Basu, Chau and Kanbur (2007) who develop a model of 
partial compliance, and Bhorat et al. (2012), who develop an ‘index of violation’, I examine 
changes in the depth of violation. Here the aim is to capture the spectrum of compliance 
which assumes that employers do not simply choose to comply or not to comply. Rather they 
can be expected to decide on how much to comply based on personal utility functions and a 
range of external factors. The data shows evidence of wages that have increased due to the 
law, but not all the way up to the level of the minimum. 
The index of violation is a measure of noncompliance analogous to the Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (FGT) (1984) measure of poverty
26
. It is similarly decomposable and not only 
measures the number of workers who earn below the minimum but can be used to account for 
the depth of violation i.e. how far below the minimum each individual’s wage is. For 
example, if the minimum wage is R800, an individual earning R799 and an individual 
earning R199 are both earning sub-minimum wages but the depth of violation is vastly 
different. The index of violation takes this into account and treats the minimum wage as the 
poverty line in the FGT measure.  
 




 ,    (5) 
where  is the official minimum wage for farmworkers in a given year, and  captures 
farmworker wages for each worker. When =0 this is simply a ‘headcount index’ for the 
population which reveals the proportion of workers earning below the minimum. When =1 
the violation function is a measure of the gap between farmworker wages and the minimum 
wage. When =2  becomes the squared gap and gives more weight to wages that fall further 
below the minimum.  The violation gap (V1) and squared violation gap (V2) are used to 
examine the changing nature of violation in the post-law period. Along with kernel density 
plots I employ a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with  as a dependent 
variable to examine changes in the post-law period.  
 
If formal enforcement appears to have no effect on compliance there are a number of possible 
conclusions. On one hand, the proxies for enforcement may be poor and unable to pick up the 
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For α ≥0 where z is the poverty line, yi is the standard of living, g indicator of the ith household, and α is the 
‘aversion to poverty’ parameter. The higher the value of α, the more sensitive the measure is to the well-being of 
the poorest person. The headcount index is obtained by setting α=0, the poverty gap by setting α=1. Setting α=2 
gives the squared poverty gap.  
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effects of formal enforcement. This is plausible but unfortunately there are currently no other 
data available which can be used to capture enforcement effectively. It may be that 
compliance is not responding to formal enforcement. Employers could instead be adjusting 
wages due to some sense of fairness in wage setting where the minimum wage has redefined 
the wage floor. Another possibility is that peer effects – where one employer’s decision 
influences other employers in the area, may play a role. Particularly if there is a limited pool 
of seasonal labour, the effect of one employer’s choice to comply may have the effect of 
forcing others to follow suit. This would be necessary to avoid employee dissatisfaction, low 
productivity of workers, or even a drop in the availability of labour in the short term. Such an 
outcome would depend on how effectively employers collude and communicate. 
Unfortunately this is an untestable hypothesis without detailed panel data. A further 
hypothesis, which is tested in Section 5, is that the threat of formal enforcement is simply not 
credible for the typical employer. 
4 Descriptive Statistics and Econometric Results 
Despite contributing less than three percent to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 2000 
and 2007 agriculture remains foundational for the South African economy in many respects 
and accounts for almost ten percent of formal employment (StatsSA, 2008). A major purpose 
of the agricultural Sectoral Determination was to provide protection for workers in a sector 
which is poorly unionised and reports the lowest average wages in the country. In addition to 
setting a legal wage floor, the new law also outlines terms and conditions of employment for 
the farming sector which include maximum working hours and the establishment of a written 
employment contract for employees. The Sectoral Determination was published on the 2nd of 
December 2002 and came into effect on the 16th of December 2002
28
. Provisions related to 
the minimum wage, however, only came into effect on the 1st of March 2003. September 
2003 is treated as the first wave where the impacts of the law should be evident. Two separate 
wage levels are prescribed for full-time farmworkers, according to geographic location: a 
higher minimum wage for those working within urbanised municipal areas (Area A) and a 
lower wage for predominantly rural areas (Area B)
29
. In March 2003 when the law was 
introduced these were, R800 and R600 per month, respectively. The minimum wage is 
regularly updated for inflation through a formal government gazetting process which is 
publicly available on the Department of Labour’s (DoL) website (See Appendix Table 2). 
These minima were set relatively high upon introduction .cutting at around the 70th 
percentile of the wage distribution in both cases. 
 
The introduction of minimum wages appears to have had some immediate and substantial 
effects for the farmworkers covered by the law. Table 1 provides an overview of workers in 
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the 1996 census, where: 
A. Average income greater than R24, 000 per annum 
B. Average income between R12, 000 and R24, 000 per annum. 













the agricultural sector by presenting key features of the sample over time. The typical 
demographic of a farmworker in South Africa is clear. Most individuals in the sample are 
African, male, have few years of education (less than six), and are engaged in full-time 
employment. Table 2 provides an equivalent set of data for the chosen control group. The 
similarities of this group are immediately evident. These workers are also typically African, 
male, have between seven and eight years of education, and work full time. The descriptive 
statistics in this section offer interesting preliminary results which shed light on the average 
impact of the law. Specifically I focus on the changes in employment, farmworker wages, 
contract coverage, and hours worked. Complementing the descriptive statistics are results 
from the statistical analyses. These results provide further weight to the initial findings and 
allow a more careful exploration of the observed changes. In particular, the use of difference-
in-differences regressions link observed changes in the variables of interest directly to the 
introduction of the law.  
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Considering the first row of Table 1 it is evident that the number of farm workers sampled in 
each wave remains relatively stable over the period. This is reassuring and should increase 
the reliability of the weighted estimates. Changes in employment are the first area of interest. 
The proportionally weighted sample in row two uses the new weights calculated by Branson 
(2009) and provides an estimate of the number of farmworkers employed in South Africa. 
This sample only includes those workers who are covered by the law according to LFS 
classifications. The figures in Table 1 show that the number of farmworkers falls by almost 
200 000 between Sept. 2002 and Sept. 2003, which is a decrease of over 20 percent. Table 2 
provides comparable data on the change in the number of workers in the control group, where 
a gradual increase in employment can be observed. This gives an initial indication that 
farmworker employment fell as a result of the law. To examine the change graphically Figure 
1 plots the weighted number of workers in each group over the period and shows that 
employment in the control group rises steadily over time while farmworker employment 
starts falling in March 2003 (the law was announced in December 2002) and does not 
recover. To rule out the possibility that this decrease may have been driven by economic 
conditions in the agricultural sector Table 3 details average growth levels over the period. 
The growth in agricultural Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was approximately one percent 
and thus while employment losses may have come from increased capitalisation of farming 
activities it is implausible that the sector was forced to shed jobs due to contracting output. 
 
Another possibility is that these employment losses were driven by particular conditions 
facing certain areas of South Africa. Figure 2 plots the farmworker employment data by 
province, and illustrates that this decrease was not exclusive to only a few provinces but that 
employment appears to have decreased everywhere from its pre-law levels. Notably, the 
Western Cape (WC) and Kwazulu Natal (KZN) have experienced the largest declines in 
employment. While it is difficult to attribute the overall decrease in farmworker employment 
entirely to the new law it is telling that employment continues to remain at this lower level 
after September 2003. Moreover, no similar reduction is evident in the control group over the 













male and female farmworkers experienced similar changes. The data reveals that employment 
shares for males and females remain fairly stable over the period. 
A second area of interest is the average wage response to the introduction of the law. Rows 
nine and ten in Table 1 present monthly and hourly wages for farmworkers; Table 2 presents 
equivalent data for the control group. From Table 1 it is immediately clear that farmworker 
wages are extremely low. This does suggest that the law is well-targeted. Examining changes 
in the wage data over time one can observe that monthly wages and hourly wages rise sharply 
within six months of the law coming into effect, by R173 and R1.00 respectively. 
Importantly, this wage spike immediately after the introduction of the law is not evident in 
the wages of the control group. However, given that the level of variation in wages is large, 
average figures cannot offer evidence of changes with a high degree of confidence. Analysing 
wage data by province does provide a more precise picture of the changes, as does applying a 
log transformation. Figure 3 presents the log of hourly wages for each province and here the 
increase in wages is evident for all provinces. A striking result from this figure is the 
compression of wages among provinces in the post-law period which is typically observed in 
response to minimum wage laws that are binding. The provinces where average wages 
increase most are those where prior to the law wages were lowest, e.g.: The Free State and 
Limpopo. This suggests that many employers at the low end of the distribution – from whom 
the minimum wage legislation required the largest adjustments – are responding to the law. In 
order to more accurately evaluate these changes kernel density plots of hourly and monthly 
wage are presented for farmworkers and the control group.  
Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 contain kernel density plots of wages for September 2001 – September 
2007. Each line is a smoothed plot of the log of real wages (either hourly or monthly). The 
figures use data from the September waves of the LFS and therefore include two waves 
before the law’s introduction and five thereafter. The vertical red line represents the full-time 
urban minimum wage in 2007. Figures 4 and 6 present hourly and monthly farmworker 
earnings, respectively. In the pre-law period (shown by the black and grey lines) there is no 
evidence that earnings are shifting in real terms; in fact the 2001 distribution is slightly to the 
right of the distribution in 2002 suggesting a slight decline in real earnings. However, the 
distribution shifts noticeably to the right in September 2003, ten months after the 
announcement of the law. The distribution then gradually moves to the right for all of the 
post-law years, with the final wave being most pronounced. Testing for distributional 
differences using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests shows that each of the post-law distributions 
is significantly different from those before the law was introduced, at the 5 percent level.  
Figures 5 and 7 plot the distribution of real hourly and monthly wages, respectively, for the 
control group. The kernel density plots suggest that no significant changes in wages have 
occurred for the control group over the period. Testing for this statistically using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test confirms that none of the post-law distributions are significantly 
different from the distributions in the period prior to the introduction of the law. As a 
comparison with the wage increases experienced by farmworkers these figures suggest that 
the law had an observable and substantial impact in the agricultural sector.  Table 4, which 

















The third variable of interest in this study is the existence of a formal employment contract 
for farmworkers. Establishing such a contract was mandated by the Sectoral Determination 
and can be observed in the data. The variable to be examined is based on a response to the 
question, ‘Do you have a written employment contract with your employer?’ and goes some 
way to identifying if the Sectoral Determination provided real benefits for farmworkers. This 
is an important question, especially given the difficulty of identifying changes in non-
pecuniary benefits over time; the worry being that while wages have clearly increased this 
increase may have to some extent been a reallocation of non-monetary payments. The 
establishment of a written contract which includes agreements regarding payment, hours of 
work, overtime pay, and leave, can be seen as an important progression for workers in an 
otherwise under-protected sector.  
The final row of Table 1 provides information on the percentage of workers in the sector who 
hold such contracts. It is evident that this proportion rises considerably between September 
2002 and September 2003, coverage increases by 17 percent over the 12 month period. It has 
almost doubled by September 2007. A significant portion of this increase appears to be a 
result of the legislation when the control group is used as a comparison. Although it is 
unclear what regulations govern the establishment of contracts for workers in the control 
group the timing of the increase in Table 1 is informative when compared to the gradual 
changes observable in Table 2. The largest increase over a 12 month period in the control 
group is six percent. For a vulnerable sector such as farmworkers, increased contract 
coverage is an important development and it appears that the Sectoral Determination has had 
some impact here. 
The fourth and final variable of interest in this section is the number of hours worked, which 
could be expected to change as a result of the law. In theory employers may reduce the 
number of hours their employees work in order to comply with the 45 hours per week 
maximum set out in the Sectoral Determination, or else simply to afford the higher wage. 
Hamermesh (1993) argues that, ‘employers are quicker to alter hours in response to shocks 
than they are to change levels of employment’ (p. 294). Further, if employers have to increase 
wages due to the law they might require more productivity per hour from each worker and in 
this way be able to reduce hours worked. Alternatively, it is a common stylized fact that full-
time workers earn more than similar part-time employees. This suggests that full-timers 
produce more per hour. If this is true, firms may lengthen work-weeks rather than reduce 
them in response to a minimum wage increase (Brown, 1999). The theoretical effect of 
minimum wages on hours worked is therefore ambiguous. Hertz (2005) finds that the 
minimum wage reduced hours of work for domestic workers in South Africa. Contradicting 
this Dinkelman and Ranchhod (2010) find no evidence that employers adjusted on the 
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intensive margin to accommodate the Sectoral Determination. Expectations as to the 
Agricultural Sector’s response in this regard are thus unclear.  
In contrast to the changes observed in employment, wages, and contract coverage, Table 1 
suggests that average hours of work in the agricultural sector remained unaffected by the law. 
No definite trend in hours worked can be isolated from the data. Similarly, average hours 
worked among individuals in the control group appears relatively stable across the period. 
What is evident is that on average farmworkers report working more than 45 hours per week 
for every year. Table 4 shows that typically men work more hours per week than women. To 
examine the changes in hours worked more critically figure 8 plots a kernel density function. 
The vertical line is placed at 45 hour per week. The density plot confirms that no significant 
changes in hours worked have taken place over the period. This result, together with the 
observed changes in employment and wages, suggests that perhaps employers adjusted on the 
extensive margin to afford the larger wage bill and thus the law did not have an impact on the 
intensive margin.  
4.2 Econometric Results 
The econometric results present output from the difference-in-differences regressions. 
Changes in employment, wages, contract coverage, and hours worked are analysed 
statistically to explore whether the observed changes were unique to farmworkers, as well as 
to examine whether the minimum wage law had a greater impact in areas where wages were 
lower in the pre-law period. The previously specified control group is used as a comparison 
in this analysis, the exception being for the analysis of employment where a broader group is 
chosen. 
 
In Table 5 I present the difference-in-differences results for probability of employment. The 
binary dependent variable is whether an individual works as a farmworker (one) or not (zero), 
and the second column includes controls for individual worker characteristics. The sample 
includes farmworkers and all demographically similar individuals who are either employed or 
looking for work
31
. This includes approximately 320 000 individuals across all 15 waves. 
Using this sample allows for farmworkers to lose or switch jobs in the post-law period. If 
employment has in fact fallen for farmworkers due to the law, as the descriptive data shows, 
then one should see a decrease in the probability of farm employment after March 2003. The 
results show that the probability of an individual in the sample working as a farmworker has 
fallen by between 13-15% in the period after the law. Interestingly, the results indicate that 
the probability of agricultural employment is slightly higher in areas where the wage gap was 
bigger. Upon reflection this makes intuitive sense given that agricultural wages are the lowest 
of any sector. This could simply be picking up districts with more farmworkers and therefore 
lower wages. The results also show that the probability of farm employment after the law is 
slightly lower in areas where the wage gap was largest. The coefficients are all significant. 
This result, together with the descriptive data which illustrates the trends in the number of 
farmworkers over time, provides compelling evidence that the minimum wage has had 
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observable disemployment effects in the agricultural sector. However, it must be noted that 
the exact size of this effect is difficult to measure in the absence of a representative panel data 
set.  
 
Regarding earnings, I consider the descriptive data to be compelling evidence of a large shift 
in wages due to the introduction of the new law; the density plots in particular make this 
clear. Nevertheless, it is possible that some external factors have affected farmworker wages 
during the period and the results presented are coincidental. In order to isolate the effect of 
the law the difference-in-differences approach tests whether farm workers experienced 
significant changes in wages in the post-law period when compared to a similar group of 
workers not covered by the law (i.e. the control group). This does appear to be the case. It is 
also shown that districts with a higher wage gap experienced greater wage increases after the 
law. The results are contained in Table 6. 
Column 1 compares the wage outcomes of farmworkers against wages of the control group, 
using equation 1, as specified in Section 3. The sample includes farmworkers and the control 
group, containing 90 000 observations across all waves. Results show that wages in the post-
law period have risen by approximately 28%, for all workers in the sample. The farmworker 
dummy variable indicates that, when compared to individuals in the control group, 
farmworkers earn significantly lower wages. On average farmworker wages are over 50% 
lower than the wages earned by similar workers in other occupations; this is for the entire 
period. Of principal interest is the difference-in-differences estimator which reveals how 
much wages have risen for farmworkers in the post-law period relative to those in the control 
group. The output shows that the estimated effect of the law on farmworker wages was an 
increase of 17.6%. This outcome controls for the difference between the two groups as well 
as possible biases coming from trends over time.  
The output in columns two and three use the approach outlined in equation 2 (Section 3) to 
see whether the wage increases for farmworkers were larger in districts where the wage gap 
was greater. Column 3 includes controls for education, age, and race. The pre-law wage gap 
is defined so that districts with lower farmworker wages (relative to the wage of the control 
group) result in a bigger wage gap. Examining the output one can see that an increase in 
wages of between 34-38% is evident in the post-law period. The results in column 1 revealed 
that approximately half of this increase (17%) can be attributed to the law. Inspecting the 
wage gap coefficients it is clear that farmworker wages are lower in districts where the gap is 
bigger. The coefficient on  is large, significant and positive in both 
specifications. This suggests that areas with a bigger wage gap in the pre-law period saw 
greater increases in earnings after the law was introduced. Overall these are interesting 
findings; not only have farmworker wages risen in the post-law period relative to 
counterparts in other occupations, they have risen significantly more in District Councils 
where the gap between the control and treatment group wage was larger. Figure 3 supports 
this finding at the provincial level by showing that provinces with lower wages in the pre-law 













Regarding contract coverage the difference-in-differences output clearly confirms the pattern 
observed in the descriptive statistics. Table 7 presents the same set of regressions as for 
wages, where column 1 is based on equation 1 and columns 2 and 3 are produced by equation 
2. The dependent variable is whether an individual has a written employment contract or not. 
Column 1 shows a 12 percentage point increase in the fraction of farmworkers and control 
group workers who hold a written contract after the law, so contract coverage appears to have 
increased for both groups. It is also clear from the results that fewer farmworkers have 
written contracts than their counterparts in the control group (around 17% less). The 
interaction term is again of leading interest and indicates that employment contracts increased 
by 15.6% for farmworkers in the post-law period. Columns 2 and 3, which focus exclusively 
on the sample of farmworkers, also point out large and significant growth in contract 
coverage after the law. Additionally, these regressions show that districts with a larger wage 
gap in the pre-law period have fewer individuals with contracts, but that coverage increased 
by more in these areas after the law. These econometric results demonstrate that the 
formalisation of employment for farmworkers, from the point of contract coverage, has been 
positively affected by the legislation. 
Lastly, Table 8 presents results from the regression analysis on changes in hours worked from 
2000-2007. The same set of three regressions is run. None of the coefficients are statistically 
different from zero. The exception is the farmworker dummy variable in column 1 which 
simply shows that on average across all waves farmworkers work 1.6 hours more than their 
control group counterparts. The fact that no significant changes in hours worked are evident 
for farmworkers confirms what was seen in Table 1 and in figure 8 – the density function. It 
is possible that measurement error in reporting hours of work may have biased these results. 
However, apart from this possibility there is no statistical evidence indicating that employers 
have adjusted average hours of work to accommodate the large wage increases.  
5 Enforcement and Compliance in South Africa 
5.1 Overview 
The notion that the statutory minimum wage is also the actual minimum wage assumes that 
employers comply fully with the law. In South Africa, as elsewhere, this is not the case. Data 
on compliance in Table 1 shows that over 50% of farmworkers received sub-minimum wages 
in 2007. This finding establishes the quantitative significance of noncompliance, an issue 
which is generally more prevalent in sectors with large proportions of unskilled workers. 
Bhorat et al (2012) show that together with workers in the Security sector farmworkers are 
the most violated workers in South Africa. As in the case of other laws which conflict with 
the self-interest of the individual or firm, enforcement is necessary to ensure compliance. 
Regarding labour regulations this enforcement usually takes the form of inspections and 
penalties. A short description of the South African process follows
32
.  
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In South Africa the parties involved in the enforcement process are: government agencies, 
bargaining councils, trade unions, and other worker rights groups. Enforcement of the 
Agricultural Sectoral Determination, however, is governed solely by the DoL. More 
specifically the work is carried out by the Inspection and Enforcement Services (IES) unit 
within the DoL. No bargaining council exists in the agricultural sector to assist with 
enforcement activities and, in addition, the LFS reveals that unionisation among farm 
workers is close to zero. Provincial IES units are contained within the provincial DoL and 
produce a detailed enforcement framework which guides their enforcement activities. The 
IES units try to ensure compliance through a combination of inspections, investigations, 
advocacy sessions, and training programmes (DoL, 2011; Provincial Inspection Plan, 2010). 
Each provincial unit is also given an annual inspection target, handed down from the national 
level, which they must meet. For example, the Western Cape was scheduled to complete 11 
912 inspections in 2010 across all sectors (Provincial Inspection Plan, 2010). A budget for 
each province is nationally determined and based upon this the provincial IES offices decide 
on the number of inspectors they can employ. These inspectors are allocated to Labour 
Centres which are geographically dispersed across the province
33
. On average, for each five 
labour inspectors there is one team leader who coordinates their tasks and occasionally 
engages in inspection work (Provincial Inspection Plan, 2010).  
The core activities of a labour inspector are to visit employers in a particular sector and assess 
whether the applicable labour laws are being upheld, this includes laws outlined in the 
Sectoral Determination, Employment Equity legislation, as well as Occupational Health and 
Safety regulations. Inspections are both pro-active and re-active in nature. Pro-active 
inspections are planned in advance, either provincially or nationally. These are full audits of a 
sample of employers within a specific sector. Reactive inspections are conducted in response 
to complaints lodged at a Labour Centre and are thus specific to a single employer. Chapter 
10 of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) of 1997 details the appointment of 
labour inspectors, their duties, as well as the limitations of their power. The proceedings of an 
inspection are outlined in each province’s Provincial Inspection Plan and in the case of a 
reactive inspection ideally proceed as follows
34
: The inspector makes an appointment with 
the employer, making clear the documents the employer must produce to be inspected. A visit 
is made to the workplace where the inspector scrutinises the required documents (i.e. 
employment contracts, payslips etc.) and interviews employees. If violations are uncovered 
the employer is given a written undertaking which details the specifics of the violation and a 
date by which this must be rectified. A follow-up visit is arranged where the inspector checks 
whether the required changes have been made. If noncompliance persists the employer is 
served with a written compliance order and has 21 days to comply. Should the employer fail 
to do so within the allotted time, the inspector opens a case with the Labour Court and serves 
the employer a Notice of Motion. The case proceeds to the Labour Court.  
Two major problems with the efficacy of the enforcement process are noticeable. These were 
also emphasised in focus group discussions with inspectors and team leaders, as well as in 
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interviews with provincial IES officials. Firstly, concerning the penalties for violation, 
inspectors do not have the power to issue spot fines. Monetary penalties for violation of the 
law only come into force once a case of has been decided in the Labour Court and the 
employer found guilty. Importantly, the penalties imposed on noncompliant employers at this 
stage are relatively small
35
. Furthermore, in a case of underpayment, the maximum period for 
which employers can be held liable to repay wages owed, is one year. Taken together this 
suggests that financial deterrents against noncompliance are weak. The second concern 
follows from the first and relates to the time taken for a complaint to move from initial 
inspection to resolution in a Labour Court. Anecdotal evidence from inspector interviews 
suggest that cases can take years to settle, by which time employees have often relocated and 
employers may have shut down or moved elsewhere. Additional evidence from a recent 
International Labour Organisation report also suggests that the time taken to resolve cases is 
problematic (ILO, 2009). Finally the ILO’s website contains information on South African 
labour law and emphasises that the Labour Courts are slow
36
. Together, the minimal penalties 
and inefficiency of the prosecution process for offenders supports the notion that in reality 
employers do not face large deterrents against violating labour laws. Thus, one could expect 
that regardless of how motivated and active a team of inspectors may be, such efforts do little 
to encourage compliance when the correct incentives do not exist. This will be examined in 
Section 5.4.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Despite the situation described above large increases in wages suggest that a significant 
proportion of employers have begun to pay higher wages in the post law period. Of interest is 
whether work undertaken by the IES has played a role in this. There has been discussion 
attributing variation in noncompliance across different areas, to the number of inspectors 
present (Bhorat et al, 2012). Limited data on the inspectorate, however, has rendered this a 
difficult proposition to test empirically. Figure 4 illustrates that compliance does differ 
significantly across provinces, this variation is even more apparent when district-level 
compliance is analysed. However, this variation may be driven by a number of factors. For 
example one might suspect that employers in wealthier areas can afford to pay higher wages. 
Provinces such as the Western Cape and Gauteng have the highest wages (See Figure 3) and 
thus wages do not have to increase by much to achieve compliance with the minimum. This 
can be seen in when looking at Figure 3 and Figure 4 together. Compliance rates rise sharply 
for both provinces despite the fact that wages in these provinces did not increase much from 
pre-law levels relative to provinces such as Limpopo. Other factors which may influence 
compliance are discussed shortly. 
From Table 1 it is evident that the fraction of workers paid below the minimum wage 
decreases over 80% in September 2000 to around 60% in the final wave of the data. Thus 
more than half of farmworkers report earning wages below the prescribed minimum in 2007. 
The relatively low levels of compliance imply that any observed impacts of the law should be 
seen as a lower bound – these impacts would increase with greater levels of compliance. It is 
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plausible that the government initially accepts low levels of compliance and has therefore not 
committed substantial resources to enforcement
37
. This could be a rational planning decision 
given the high levels of unemployment in South Africa and the fact that greater 
disemployment effects would result from stricter enforcement
38
. However, given that the IES 
does engage in numerous enforcement activities to try and ensure compliance, it is plausible 
that these formal enforcement efforts have had some observable influence on compliance. 
This is the hypothesis I aim to test in the following section.  
5.3 The Effect of Enforcement 
This section tests for the influence of enforcement on the rise in farmworker wages. To 
analyse the effect of enforcement I apply the difference-in-differences regression shown in 
equation 3 of Section 3. The variable used by Bhorat et al (2012) as a proxy for formal 
enforcement is the number of labour inspectors per province. There are obvious problems 
with using such a blunt measure, not least of all the fact that left un-weighted the number of 
inspectors does not account for the number of employers among which inspectors have to 
allocate their efforts. In a study of enforcement in Brazil Ronconi (2008) uses the number of 
inspectors per capita, which appears to be better measure in this regard. Dinkelman and 
Ranchhod (2010) use the presence of a Labour Centre at the Magisterial District level as a 
proxy for enforcement. This measure is problematic because of the small sample size within 
each Magisterial District. I therefore follow Ronconi (2008) and use the weighted number of 
labour inspectors per province, and then also use the presence of a Labour Centre coded at 
the District Council level
39
. The reason that Labour Centres are a useful proxy for 
enforcement is that they house the Labour Inspectors and are the place where employee 
complaints regarding noncompliance are lodged.   
The total number of labour inspectors per province is presented in Figure 5. There is clearly 
some variation in the number of inspectors per province, and it will be tested whether there is 
a statistical relationship between the number of inspectors per worker and compliance levels 
over time. Since inspectors are allocated provincially a more disaggregated measure is not 
available, unfortunately this prevents taking account of the variation across districts. A larger 
inspector presence at the provincial level should increase the probability of being inspected. 
As should a greater Labour Centre presence in each District Council. At least, one might 
expect that inspectors and Labour Centres should influence employer beliefs about the chance 
of being monitored. While the number of inspectors per province is still a relatively blunt 
measure it serves as an initial exploration into enforcement in South Africa. The use of 
Labour Centres at the District Council level allows for a more disaggregated measure of 
enforcement.  
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Table 9 presents the results. The first three columns have inspectors as the enforcement proxy 
while the last three use Labour Centres. In each case the final column includes a triple 
interaction term or difference-in-differences-in-differences. The increase in wages is still 
evident on the POST coefficient for all specifications, which confirms that wages have risen 
after the law. Analysing the results it is clear that enforcement has not had a large effect on 
the wage increase. The effect of inspectors shows up as either insignificant or of negligible 
size in all three equations. A significant and positive coefficient on  
suggests that in the post-law period a greater number of inspectors is related to higher wages, 
however, the size of the coefficient is negligible. Column three includes the triple interaction 
between inspectors, the wage gap, and the time dummy. Here the sign is what one would 
expect – a positive effect in the post period for provinces with more inspectors and a higher 
wage gap. But again the size is trivial. Using the number of Labour Centre’s in each District 
Council does not appear to uncover impacts that may have been passed over at the provincial 
level. The  coefficient reports that there is no correlation between 
rising wages and the presence of a labour centre. Again the triple interaction term is of the 
expected sign but not significantly different from zero.  
Overall the data shows that the number of labour inspectors and the presence of a Labour 
Centre had no significant influence on the change in farmworker wages after the law. While 
these proxies for enforcement may be poor the results do provide a sense of the effect that 
formal mechanisms have had in this sector, which appears negligible. In addition I test 
whether inspectors may have had a lagged effect on compliance, i.e. whether the number of 
inspectors this year impacts on compliance levels in the following year; this does not change 
the results. Based on the evidence provided, employers seem not to be influenced by existing 
government enforcement. 
5.4 A Theoretical Model of Compliance 
Returning to the theoretical literature on enforcement it is possible to analyse compliance 
incentives facing employers in order to gain insight into observed employer behaviour. The 
results of this enquiry help to make sense of the high levels of noncompliance and the fact 
that current enforcement efforts have had no observable impact. The Ashenfelter and Smith 
(1979) equation was outlined in Section 1 (see footnote 11) and shows that when considering 
the trade-off between compliance and noncompliance a profit maximising employer will not 
comply if the expected benefit from paying sub-minimum wages exceeds the expected 
penalty. This equation can be rearranged and stated formally: 
             (6)
40
 
A rational employer will choose to violate if the left hand side (LHS) of the equation exceeds 
the right hand side (RHS). The expected benefit of not complying (LHS) is the chance of not 
being detected  multiplied by the total labour costs saved by paying workers below 
                                                          
40
 See Ashenfelter and Smith (1979) for a full derivation of the LHS of equation (4), and Chang and Erlich 
(1985) for an extension of the penalty structure (RHS). Weil (2005) provides a simple empirical application of 













the legal minimum. The expected penalty (RHS) is the probability of being caught ( ) 
multiplied by the price that each firm must pay for their crime. Here I make two adjustments 
to the typical models found in the literature on how the penalty is modelled. Generally the 
theoretical literature specifies the cost of violation either as a fixed penalty (as in Ashenfelter 
and Smith, 1979) or some proportion of the back wages owed (as in Grenier, 1982, and 
Chang and Erlich, 1985). However, in the South African setting a noncompliant employer not 
only has to pay a penalty for violation (this is a percentage of the back wages owed
41
), but 
must also obviously correct his fault and pay employees what they are owed. The latter cost 
does not appear in previous models of compliance. Thus the full penalty in equation 4 is 
some percentage ( )
 
of the back wages owed plus the back wages themselves, for each 
employee . In addition, due to the long delays found in the South African Labour 
Courts I include a discounting factor  which allows employers to evaluate the 
expected penalty at some future date based on an annual interest rate  and  years.  
Clearly from equation 6 one can see that the benefit of noncompliance increases with 
underpayment, but so does the possible penalty. The equation also shows that there are three 
employer-related characteristics which increase the incentive to violate (i.e. pay sub-
minimum wages): firstly, if market wages are far below the legal minimum employers stand 
to profit more from violation, secondly, if there is a greater absolute value of the elasticity of 
labour demand ( , and thirdly, certain employer-specific features which may decrease 
inspection probability. On the contrary the enforcement agency can increase the incentives to 
comply by either raising the probability of detection ( ) or increasing the penalties for 
violation.  
Based on data gathered from the IES in the Western Cape for 2007 this equation can be 
roughly estimated. Given that the Western Cape has the highest average wages and lowest 
levels of violation this should be seen as the best case scenario in South Africa. It is possible 
that the incentives in other provinces may be slightly different; Table 10 offers a relatively 
simple scenario analysis showing how changes in key variables affect the employer’s cost-
benefit calculation. The average monthly underpayment ( ) in the agricultural industry 
in the Western Cape is R144, this is calculated for those workers who earn less than the 
minimum wage in 2007. The average probability of inspection in the province is 0.11. I arrive 
at this figure by dividing the number of agricultural inspections carried out by the Western 
Cape IES for 2007 by the number of farms in the province
42
. This provides a rough estimate 
of each employer’s chance of being inspected by the DoL. I assume a labour demand 
elasticity of -1.3 based on (Sparrow, Ortmann, Lyne and Darroch, 2008). The penalty is 
calculated for first-time offenders (25% of underpayment) and the discount factor is based on 
an annual average interest rate of 13% for 2007 and a period of 1.5 years
43
. In this scenario 
the potential annual cost of noncompliance for a typical employer in the Western Cape is R2 
658. The annual economic benefit of paying sub-minimum wages is R 20 659. This implies 
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that profit maximising farmers should rationally choose not to comply with the minimum 
wage law. This conclusion helps to explain the high levels of noncompliance observed in the 
LFS data which is based on self-reported wage data. Data from the Western Cape IES for 
2007 supports this by showing that inspections in the agricultural sector found approximately 
50% compliance with the Sectoral Determination. The theoretical model provides clear 
insight into the rationale behind the noncompliant employer’s choice. 
5.5 Depth of Violation 
In this final section I use the index of violation defined in Section 3 to examine changes in the 
depth of violation among farmworkers after the Sectoral Determination came into effect. 
Table 1 showed that the number of workers earning sub-minimum wages in Area A and B 
decreased over the period, although the proportion remains high. This headcount index 
revealed that between 60 and 66 percent of workers were earning less than the law required in 
2007. What such data does not reveal is the depth of the underpayment.  
Table 11 presents the index of violation for farmworkers; this can be seen as an analogue to 
the FGT measures where the minimum wage is used instead of a poverty line. The ratio 
(V1/V0) allows for the interpretation of V1. This fraction denotes the percentage shortfall of 
wages for farmworkers earning below the minimum. Put differently, violated workers in this 
sample are earning (V1/V0) below the relevant minima on average. Clearly the depth of 
violation has gradually decreased over the period. The data shows that in 2007 workers who 
earned sub-minimum wages received wages that were 30% below the minimum on average 
in Area A. This figure is slightly higher at 36% in areas falling within the Area B 
classification. The estimates for V2, the severity of violation, in 2007 are 0.09 and 0.01 for 
Areas A and B, respectively. To illustrate changes in the depth of violation over time Figure 
11 and Figure 12 plot kernel density functions for V1 and V2 over time. Both figures show 
that the depth of violation decreases significantly after 2002, suggesting that once the law 
came into effect the depth of violation decreased even if many farmworkers still earned sub-
minimum wages. In other words, this provides evidence of partial compliance with the law. 
The results of the OLS regressions are presented in Table 12. The model is estimated 
separately for two dependent variables which represent the depth of violation; firstly the 
violation gap (V1) and secondly the violation gap squared (V2). Each specification is run 
with and without controls. Columns 2 and 4 include controls for race, age and education. All 
of the coefficients on the  variable are significant. This shows that the depth of 
violation has decreased substantially in the post-law period. V1 has decreased by 13% in the 
post-law period while V2 fell by 9%. These results underscore the trends evident in Table 10 
as well as the changing distributions presented in figures 11 and 12. This simple investigation 
of changes in the depth of violation serves to illustrate is how the agricultural sector has 
responded to the law. Evidence suggests that while levels of violation remain above 50% 
many employers do not simply decide to comply or violate, but instead choose whether and 
how much to comply. Analysing changes across the distribution of violated workers showed 
that partial compliance has occurred. Many farmworkers who earn sub-minimum wages have 













6 Conclusions and Discussion 
Studying the impact of the introducing minimum wage and employment legislation into a 
vulnerable, low-wage sector is an important. It holds relevant information for policymakers 
and also provides an example of the response of a specific sector to minimum wage laws. In 
addition, this paper’s analysis of enforcement and compliance offers insight into employer 
behaviour in a sector with high levels of noncompliance – in particular, employer response to 
the presence of formal enforcement. 
Despite non-threatening levels of enforcement it appears that the Sectoral Determination had 
significant effects. Hence, farmworker wages rose by approximately 17% as a result of the 
law. Examining the difference-in-difference results it was also clear that wages rose by more 
in districts where the wage gap, between farmworker wages and control group wages, was 
higher. In other words, districts where farmworker wages were far below the median wages 
of similar workers experienced greater wage increases. This was evident despite the fact that 
approximately 60% of farmworkers still received sub-minimum wages in 2007. Regarding 
non-monetary impacts, the law also substantially increased contract coverage for 
farmworkers in South Africa. Encouragingly, the number of workers with a written 
employment contract increased to reach 57% in 2007.  
In examining the effect that the minimum wage had on employment, this paper shows that 
while no adjustments on the intensive margin were observed the data suggest that 
employment has fallen in response to the law. This was evident in the descriptive statistics, 
particularly when employment changes are compared to those experienced by the control 
group. Additionally the probability of employment as a farmworker was shown to have fallen 
by approximately 13% in the post-law period. Given that the law mandated minimum wages 
which cut at the 70th percentile of the wage distribution in 2003 it is perhaps not surprising 
that some disemployment effects are observed. Taking the context into account such effects 
are largely supported by the new minimum wage literature. Neumark and Wascher (2007) 
emphasise that disemployment effects are more likely when aggregate data is analysed and 
particularly for unskilled workers.  
Explaining exactly why certain employers comply with the legislation proved di¢ cult. 
Formal enforcement appears not to have had significant effect. This may be due to the 
relatively weak proxies used. Precise data on the number of inspections carried out in each 
area would provide a more accurate picture of how enforcement activities affect employers’ 
compliance decisions. However, an analysis of the enforcement procedure together with a 
theoretical model of employer compliance highlights the lack of incentives for employers to 
comply with the minimum wage law. In other words, the lack of a credible threat. This is 
driven by a combination of the low inspection probability, relatively small fines, a high 
elasticity of labour demand, and an extremely slow legal procedure. Interviews with the 
Western Cape IES highlighted the possibility of adjustments to the status quo which could 
solve the problem: allowing inspectors to issue spot fines for violations, as well as 
criminalising the contravening of certain labour laws, were two points consistently mentioned 
in interviews and focus groups as better mechanisms to deter offenders and avoid the 













Despite the insignificant impact of enforcement and the incentives facing employers which 
encourage noncompliance, the observed changes in wages, employment and contract 
coverage suggest that some compliance has occurred. Examining changes in the depth of 
violation provided evidence that many employers partially complied with the law even if they 
did not increase wages all the way to the minimum. This was also clear in the kernel density 
plots of farmworker wage distributions. Moreover, the fact that the earnings distribution 
compressed (the variance decreased) after the law suggests that employers increased wages 
toward the minimum, but not above it. It is possible that peer effects played a role in causing 
certain employers to increase wages; however, this would be most easily tested using a set of 
panel data. 
Perhaps a more plausible reason for the law’s effectiveness could be found in models of 
fairness in wage-setting. Particularly since the data showed that partial compliance took place 
in all areas. A theoretical literature in labour economics develops the idea of a ‘fair wage’. 
This is important for employers as it is key to inducing workers to provide high effort in 
settings where monitoring is difficult (Akerlof, 1982, 1984; Akerlof and Yellen, 1988). In the 
South African case, it is plausible that the announcement of the mini- mum wage created, or 
adjusted, employer conceptions of what constitutes a fair wage. This may have resulted in 
voluntary employer responses despite the lack of formal incentives to comply (through 
inspections and penalties). A study by Bhorat (2000) focusing on farmworkers and domestic 
workers hints at this possibility, “[A modest minimum] wage would set a first-step 
benchmark for good wage practice amongst employers. Indeed, such an initial minimum 
wage may set a positive trend, and see employers gradually increase the wages paid to these 
workers”.(Bhorat 2000:12). The evidence of partial compliance supports the idea that 
employers are responding to a new wage floor. It is also possible that this partial compliance 
is initially accepted by the government in order to bring about real changes in outcomes in the 
longer term without incurring significant short run disemployment. A theoretical model of 
this is posited by Basu, Chau and Kanbur (2010) where the authors show that ‘turning a blind 
eye’ to a portion of minimum wage violations can constitute an equilibrium outcome. 
 
In conclusion it must be emphasised that the inability to obtain data on the changes in non-
monetary income is a limitation of this work. In addition, the lack of precise data on 
inspection activities inhibits the analysis of formal enforcement. This is, however, a new and 
significant area of research in South Africa requiring more in-depth study. Another caveat is 
that the data covers a relatively short period of time after the introduction of the law. In the 
longer term, as the agricultural sector responds to this legislation, the effects observed here 
may change. Future studies may find valuable insight in examining the fluctuating nature of 
agricultural employment to see how employers respond to the legislation over time, 















Table A1. LFS Mapping: District Council Codes, Farm Areas, Magisterial District Codes 
 
District Council Farm Area LC
DC1 A 1 131-138
DC2 A 2 108-109, 112, 126-130
DC3 A 1 113-115, 117
DC4 A 4 116, 118-125
DC5 B 1 139-124
DC6 A 2 301-304, 325
DC7 B 1 305-314, 319, 324, 326
DC8 A 1 315-316, 323
DC9 B 1 317-318, 320-321
DC10 B 2 201, 221-222, 224, 227-228, 231-239
DC12 B 6 202, 212-213, 217 219-220, 223, 225-226, 230, 242-249, 251-252, 255-256, 265, 273
DC13 B 2 206, 208-209, 214-216, 218, 229, 253, 268, 271, 274-275,
DC14 B 1 203-205 207, 210-211 261, 276
DC15 B 2 250, 254, 257-258, 263-264, 266-267, 267-270, 272
DC16 B 2 402-405, 434, 436, 439-441, 446-449
DC17 A 2 433, 435, 437, 442, 444-445, 451
DC18 B 1 401, 406-410, 412-413, 417, 421, 431, 443
DC19 B 4 422-430, 432, 438, 452
DC20 B 3 411, 414-416 418-420 450
DC21 B 1 508, 510-511, 541
DC22 B 2 505-507, 514-515, 517-519
DC23 B 2 521-524
DC24 B 1 516, 520, 526-527, 546-547
DC25 B 1 525, 528-529
DC26 B 2 530-533, 548-549, 551
DC27 B 0 535, 539, 550
DC28 B 1 534, 536-538, 545
DC29 B 1 540, 543-544
DC30 B 8 801-808, 810-811, 824
DC31 A 6 809, 812-813, 815-817, 827-831
DC32 B 3 819-823, 825-826
DC33 B 1 913, 916-918
DC34 B 2 902, 905, 911-912, 928-931
DC35 B 2 904, 919-920, 922-923
DC36 B 3 906-910, 921
DC37 B 3 606, 615-619
DC38 B 5 605, 607-608, 613
DC39 B 0 601, 603-604, 609, 611
DC40 B 3 610, 612, 614, 716
DC42 A 4 706 712-713, 722-723
DC43 B 1 509, 512-513 513
DC44 B 0 259-260, 262, 277
CBDC1 B 1 322, 602
CBDC2 A 1 720-721
CBDC3 B 1 924-925, 814, 818
CBDC4 B 2 901, 903, 914-915, 926-927
CBDC8 A 2 715, 717, 719
Cape Town A 4 102-107, 110-111
Port Elizabeth A 2 204-241
Durban A 3 501-504, 542
East Rand A 6 707-711, 714
Johannesburg A 4 704-705, 718, 724















Table A2. Agricultural Sectoral Determination for Areas A & B, Annually Adjusted 
 
Year 
Area Type 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
A  R 800 R 871.58 R 949.58 R 994 R 1041 
B R 650 R 713.65 R 785.76 R 885 R 989 
 
Table A3. OLS Regression on Farmworker Wages 
 
  
VARIABLES Log of Monthly Wages
Males 0.169***
(0.00744)
































Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *













Table A4. Maximum Permissible Fines for Violation 
Maximum Permissible Fines (Schedule 2 of the BCEA, 1997)  
Maximum Permissible Fine not involving underpayment 
No previous violation R100 per employee 
No previous violation in respect of the same 
provision of the Act 
R200 per employee 
A previous violation the same year or two 
violations in respect to the same provision 
during the past 3 years 
R300 per employee 
3 previous violations of the same provision 
within 3 years 
R400 per employee 
4 previous violations of the same provision 
within 3 years 
R500 per employee 
Maximum Permissible Fine involving underpayment 
No previous violation 25 % of the underpayment, including any interest 
owing on the amount at the time of the order  
A previous violation of the same provision 
during the past 3 years 
50 % of the amount due including applicable 
interest 
A previous violation of the same provision 
within a year, or 2 previous violations, or 2 
previous violations of the same provision 
75 % of the amount due, including applicable 
interest 
3 previous violations of the same provision 
during the past three years 
100 % of the amount due including applicable 
interest 
3 previous violations of the same provision 
during the past three years 
















Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Average Characteristics of Farmworkers (2000-2007) 
 






2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
N 2 730 2 433 2 738 2 055 2 399 2 438 2 453 2 366
Weighted 805 715 804 162 819 048 623 750 538 538 515 046 513 332 553 806
Area A 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.47 0.39 0.34 0.36 0.37
Age 36 37 37 37 38 37 38 37
Education 5.50 5.42 5.34 5.54 5.45 5.82 5.94 6.03
Male 0.69 0.73 0.70 0.72 0.70 0.73 0.69 0.71
African 0.84 0.74 0.79 0.76 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.83
Full-Time 0.85 0.94 0.89 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.93
Hours per Week 46 51 48 50 49 49 48 46
Nominal Monthly Wage 630 707 684 857 920 1036 1242 1337
Nominal Hourly Wage 2.8 3.3 3.1 4.1 4.3 4.8 5.9 6.5
Fraction < Min. (Area A) 0.82 0.71 0.72 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.59
Fraction < Min. (Area B) 0.86 0.79 0.82 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.66
Written Contract 0.31 0.30 0.34 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.56
Figures are calculated from the South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS) for September 2000-September 2007. All statistics 
are weighted.  Full time workers are those working more than 27 hours per week. The dashed red line indicates the timing of 
the law (March 2003). The wage variables presented are medians for full-time workers. Noncompliance before 2003 is 
based on the minima adjusted backwards using the formula contained in the Agricultural Sectoral Determination.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
N 4 121 3 773 3 603 3 379 3 781 4 455 4 456 4 228
Weighted 1 785 730 1 600 441 1 636 771 1 682 776 1 796 746 2 162 153 2 128 327 2 038 391
Area A 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.55 0.44 0.41 0.42 0.41
Age 38 41 40 40 38 44 46 41
Education 7.65 7.72 7.88 8.05 8.25 8.27 8.37 8.25
Male 0.62 0.59 0.62 0.56 0.62 0.58 0.58 0.61
African 0.83 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.86
Full-Time 0.87 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.89
Hours per Week 45 43 45 46 46 46 45 45
Mean Monthly Wage 1 321 1 210 1 307 1 367 1 441 1 492 1 736 1 961
Mean Hourly Wage 6.24 5.84 6.16 6.83 7.17 7.01 8.58 9.91
Fraction < Farm Min.* 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.32 0.28
Written Contract 0.46 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.63 0.57 0.60 0.64
Figures are calculated from the South African Labour Force Surveys (LFS) for September 2000-September 2007. All 
statistics are weighted.  Full time workers are those working more than 27 hours per week. The dashed red line 
indicates the timing of the law (March 2003). The wage variables presented are medians for full-time workers. * The 















Figure 1: Weighted Number of Workers (2000-2007) 
 
The dashed red line represents the timing of the law. Data are from September 2000 – September 2007. 
Farmworkers are those workers covered by the agricultural Sectoral Determination. The Control Group includes 
similar workers who are not covered by the minimum wage, see Section 2. 
 
Figure 2: Weighted Number of Farmworkers, by Province (2000-2007) 
 
The dashed red line represents the timing of the law. Provinces are coded as: 1-Western Cape (WC), 2-Eastern 
Cape (EC), 3-Northern Cape (NC), 4-Free State (FS), 5-Kwa-Zulu Natal (KZN), 6-North West (NW), 7-
Gauteng (GTG), 8-Mpumalanga (MPM), and 9-Limpopo (LMP). 
Table 3: Gross Domestic Product and Value added by Industry (Constant 2005 Prices) 
  2000 2007 2000-2007 
































































































































































































































Million Million Rate 
Primary Sectors 
 
        
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishing 
34 787  3.0% 36 301  2.3% 1.2% 
Mining and quarrying 99 069  8.6% 105 336  6.7% 0.6% 
Secondary Sectors 
 
        
Manufacturing 222 579  19.2% 290 246  18.6% 4.4% 
Electricity, gas and water 28 597  2.5% 35 294  2.3% 3.1% 
Construction 26 410  2.3% 48 971  3.1% 8.8% 
Tertiary Sectors 
 
        
Wholesale, retail, motor 
trade and accommodation 
161 503  14.0% 217 607  13.9% 4.8% 
Transport, storage and 
communication 
102 874  8.9% 156 289  10.0% 6.4% 
Finance, real estate and 
business services 
216 747  18.7% 349 501  22.4% 6.6% 
General government 
services 
191 340  16.5% 223 618  14.3% 1.9% 
Personal services 75 735  6.5% 98 247  6.3% 3.9% 
Aggregate GDP 1 157 441    
1 561 
410  
  4.4% 
Source: Own Calculations (StatsSA, 2011) 
Table 4: Gender Composition: Nominal Earnings, Hours Worked, Employment, Contracts  
 
Source: Own Calculations September LFS 2000-2007.  
Employment Share, by Gender
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male 0.69 0.67 0.69 0.74 0.69 0.71 0.70 0.71
Female 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.26 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.29
Monthly Farmworker Wage, by Gender
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male 615 733 801 986 1012 1035 1231 1412
Female 438 471 490 615 649 826 996 1030
% Farmworkers with Written Contracts, by Gender
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male 0.33 0.29 0.32 0.49 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.52
Female 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.40 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.53
Hours Worked, by Gender
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Male 48 52 50 51 51 51 50 50













Figure 3: Farmworker Log Real Hourly Wages per Province (2000-2007) 
 
The solid red line represents the 2003 minimum wage and the dashed red line represents the timing of the law. 
















































































































Figure 4: Distribution of Farmworker Log Real Hourly Wages (2001-2007) 
 
Data are from the September Waves of the LFS 2001-2007. The vertical line is the level of the full-time 
minimum wage in 2003. Each wave of data contains between 1811 and 2417 observations. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests for equality of distributions are rejected at the 5% level for each pairwise comparison of waves in 
the before and after periods. 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of Control Group Log Real Hourly Earnings (2001-2007) 
 
Data are from the September Waves of the LFS 2001-2007. The vertical line is the level of the full-time 
minimum wage in 2003. Each wave of data contains between 3801 and 4507 observations. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests for equality of distributions are not rejected at the 5% level for each pairwise comparison of 
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Figure 6: Distribution of Farmworker Log Real Monthly Earnings (2001-2007) 
 
Data are from the September Waves of the LFS 2001-2007. The vertical line is the level of the full-time 
minimum wage in 2003. Each wave of data contains between 1811 and 2417 observations. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests for equality of distributions are rejected at the 5% level for each pairwise comparison of waves in 
the before and after periods. 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of Control Group Log Real Monthly Earnings (2001-2007) 
 
Data are from the LFS 2001-2007. The vertical line is the level of the full-time minimum wage in 2003. Each 
wave of data contains between 3801 and 4507 observations. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of 
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Figure 8: Usual number of hours worked per week 
 
Data are from the September Waves of the LFS 2001-2007. The vertical line is set at 45 hours. Each wave of 
data contains between 1809 and 2381 observations. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of distributions are 
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Table 5: Probability of working as a Farmworker 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
      
POST -0.1528*** -0.13676*** 
  (0.00161) (0.00155) 
Wage Gap 0.0364*** 0.0229*** 
  (0.00222) (0.00215) 
Wage Gap*POST -0.0418*** -0.0327*** 
  (0.00270) (0.00261) 
Controls for Education, Age, African NO YES 
Constant 0.0580*** 0.378*** 
  (0.00128) (0.00272) 
      
Observations 320,171 320,171 
R-squared 0.002 0.072 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions are weighted. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is whether the individual is employed 
as a farmworker (1) or not (0). The sample includes individuals of working age 
who are unemployed or searching for work who have no more than 12 years of 
education. POST = 1 after March 2003 and 0 otherwise. The Wage Gap is the 
district level difference between the log of median farmworker wages and the log 
of median wages for the control group.  
Table 6: Log Hourly Wages, Difference-in-Differences 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
POST 0.284*** 0.340*** 0.388*** 
  (0.00840) (0.0624) (0.0530) 
Farmworker -0.548***     
  (0.0118)     
Farmworker*POST 0.176***     
  (0.0157)     
Wage Gap   -0.154* -0.1394* 
    (0.0811) (0.0708) 
Wage Gap*POST   0.221** 0.1751** 
    (0.101) (0.0907) 
Controls for Age, African, Education   NO YES 
Constant 1.338*** 0.871*** 0.687*** 
  (0.00666) (0.0495) (0.0560) 
        
Observations 90,986 33,892 33,575 
R-squared 0.063 0.068 0.228 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
regressions are weighted. Regression 1 is run on the sample of farmworkers and 
the control group. Regressions 2 and 3 include only farmworkers. Regressions have 
the 'Log of Hourly Wages' as dependent variables. POST = 1 after March 2003 and 
0 otherwise. The Wage Gap is the district level difference between the log of 













Table 7: Contract Coverage, Difference-in-Differences 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
POST 0.124*** 0.140*** 0.169*** 
  (0.00475) (0.0145) (0.0144) 
Farmworker -0.170***     
  (0.00613)     
Farmworker*POST 0.0561***     
  (0.00801)     
Controls for Education, Age, African   NO YES 
Wage Gap   -0.178*** -0.132*** 
    (0.0189) (0.0188) 
Wage Gap*POST   0.0876*** 0.0331 
Constant 0.496*** 0.421*** 0.443*** 
  (0.00382) (0.0108) (0.0128) 
        
Observations 69,743 31,218 31,017 
R-squared 0.040 0.038 0.064 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions are 
weighted. Regression 1 is run on the sample of farmworkers and the control group. Regressions 2 
and 3 include only farmworkers. The dependent variable is whether the individual has a written 
employment contract (1) or not (0). POST = 1 after March 2003 and 0 otherwise. The Wage Gap is 
the district level difference between the log of median farmworker wages and the log of median 
wages for the control group. 
  
Table 8: Usual Hours of Work, Difference-in-Differences 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) 
        
POST 0.1807 0.0268 0.190 
  (0.132) (1.078) (1.075) 
Farmworker 1.642***     
  (0.189)     
Farmworker*POST 0.106     
  (0.0911)     
Controls for Education, Age, African   NO YES 
Wage Gap   1.085 1.096 
    (1.670) (1.650) 
Wage Gap*POST   -0.455 -0.579 
    (1.897) (1.881) 
Constant 47.53*** 48.60*** 50.21*** 
  (0.105) (0.892) (0.939) 
        
Observations 95,399 34,560 34,231 
R-squared 0.003 0.000 0.004 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions are 
weighted. Regression 1 is run on the sample of farmworkers and the control group. 
Regressions 2 and 3 include only farmworkers. The dependent variable is whether the 
individual has a written employment contract (1) or not (0). POST = 1 after March 2003 
and 0 otherwise. The Wage Gap is the district level difference between the log of median 













Figure 9: Levels of Compliance, per Province (2000-2007) 
 
The dashed red line represents the timing of the law. Provinces are coded as: 1-WC, 2-EC, 3-NC, 4-FS, 5-KZN, 
6-NW, 7-GTG, 8-MPM, and 9-LMP. 
 
Figure 10: Number of Inspectors per Province (2002-2007) 
 
The dashed red line represents the timing of the law. Provinces are coded as: 1-WC, 2-EC, 3-NC, 4-FS, 5-KZN, 



































































































































































































VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POST 0.267*** 0.338*** 0.299*** 0.371*** 0.398*** 0.395***
(0.0727) (0.0606) (0.0700) (0.0429) (0.0346) (0.123)
Inspectors -0.000561 0.000658 0.00260***
(0.000526) (0.000498) (0.000735)
Inspectors*POST 0.00155*** 0.00147*** -0.000567
(0.000581) (0.000548) (0.000761)






Labour Centre -0.0202** 0.00453 -0.0722**
(0.00914) (0.00810) (0.0330)
Labour Centre*POST -0.00221 0.0150 -0.0804
(0.0144) (0.0120) (0.0746)
Labour Centre*Wage Gap 0.0894*
(0.0535)
Labour Centre*Wage Gap*POST 0.00166
(0.0742)
Controls for Education, Age, African NO YES NO NO YES NO
Constant 0.879*** 0.484*** 0.704*** 0.845*** 0.432*** 1.023***
(0.0664) (0.0682) (0.0849) (0.0319) (0.0412) (0.104)
Observations 27,423 27,170 26,790 31,667 31,376 31,667
R-squared 0.058 0.218 0.062 0.077 0.257 0.083
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors for the first three regressions
are Eicker-White, clustered at the province level. All regressions are weighted. Regressions have the 'Log of Hourly
Wages' as the dependent variable. POST = 1 after March 2003 and 0 otherwise. For the first three regressions the
'Inspectors' variable is used as a proxy for enforcement and identifies the weighted number of Labour Inspectors per
province over time. The final three regressions use the presence of a Labour Centre at the district level. Both sets of
regressions include a triple interaction term.  













Table 10: Compliance Equation, Western Cape (2007), Scenario Analysis 
 
 
Calculations are based on data from the LFS, IES, and Commercial Agriculture Census. The incentives that face 
employers in the Western Cape might be somewhat different to those facing employers elsewhere in South 
Africa. Thus, the scenario analysis provides a picture of how changes in four key variables affect the profit-
maximising decision for a typical employer. These variables are: The probability of inspection, the elasticity of 
labour demand, the % of back wages paid as a penalty (based on the number of previous violations), and the 
time taken for a violating employer to be convicted.  Moving rightwards across the table, these variables are all 
adjusted gradually to show how changes increase the benefits from noncompliance. 
 
  
VARIABLES Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Probability of Inspection λ 0.30 0.25 0.15 0.11 0.05
Annual Minimum Wage (2007) M 12 492 12 492 12 492 12 492 12 492
Annual Median wage w 10 764 10 764 10 764 10 764 10 764
No. Violated Workers per farm L 12.32 12.32 12.32 12.32 12.32
Elasticity of labour demand ƞ -0.40 -0.70 -1.00 -1.30 -1.50
% of back wages penalty k 2 1 0.75 0.50 0.25
Average time to Court t 0.5 1 1.5 2 3
LHS of Equation (Benefit) 15 381 16 864 19 548 20 924 22 660
RHS of Equation (Cost) 18 781 10 032 5 053 3 005 1 004













Table 11: Index of Violation (2000-2007) 
  Area A Area B 





  V0 
2000 0.82 0.018 0.86 0.013 
2001 0.71 0.019 0.79 0.016 
2002 0.72 0.020 0.82 0.013 
2003 0.62 0.022 0.63 0.019 
2004 0.70 0.017 0.71 0.017 
2005 0.69 0.026 0.60 0.025 
2006 0.60 0.028 0.64 0.021 
2007 0.59 0.030 0.66 0.019 
  V1 
2000 0.36 0.0156 0.49 0.0150 
2001 0.30 0.0143 0.39 0.0111 
2002 0.30 0.0167 0.42 0.0138 
2003 0.20 0.0149 0.25 0.0117 
2004 0.20 0.0095 0.24 0.0110 
2005 0.22 0.0151 0.24 0.0145 
2006 0.19 0.0202 0.23 0.0132 
2007 0.18 0.0216 0.23 0.0123 
  V2 
2000 0.21 0.0136 0.33 0.0145 
2001 0.16 0.0111 0.23 0.0095 
2002 0.16 0.0133 0.25 0.0126 
2003 0.10 0.0100 0.13 0.0079 
2004 0.09 0.0065 0.13 0.0081 
2005 0.11 0.0110 0.14 0.0113 
2006 0.10 0.0161 0.13 0.0099 
2007 0.09 0.0169 0.13 0.0104 
  V1/V0 
2000 0.44   0.56   
2001 0.42   0.49 
 2002 0.41   0.51 
 2003 0.33   0.40 
 2004 0.28   0.34 
 2005 0.32   0.40 
 2006 0.32   0.36 
 2007 0.30   0.36   
N 14612 17316 
V0 is a simple headcount index which shows the percentage of farmworkers earning below the applicable 
minimum, V1 is the average distance of wages below the minimum, and V2 is the square of this gap which 
places more weight on observations furthest below the minimum. V1/V0 allows for the interpretation of V1 and 













Figure 11: Violation Gap (V1) density function (2001-2007) 
 
The figure is a kernel density plot of V1 for all farmworkers (Area A and B), calculated using the annual 
minimum wage.  
 
Figure 12: Violation Gap Squared (V2) density function (2001-2007) 
 
The figure is a kernel density plot of V2 for all farmworkers (Area A and B), calculated using the annual 
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Table 12: Partial Compliance, Depth of Violation 
          
  V1 V2 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          





  (0.00336) (0.00324) (0.00316) (0.00308) 
Controls NO YES NO YES 
Constant 0.465*** 0.357*** 0.272*** 0.177*** 
  (0.00234) (0.00761) (0.00220) (0.00723) 
          
Observations 21,603 19,486 21,603 19,486 
R-squared 0.065 0.145 0.038 0.102 
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